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AGRICULTURAL PRICING POLICY AND 
TRADE IN SEVERAL SADCC COUNTRIES 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
David S. Kingsbury1
INTRODUCTION2
In recent years, the nine SADCC member states have increasingly voiced an interest 
in expanded intraregional trade as one strategy towards increased food security 
within the region. Because six of the nine countries are landlocked, transportation 
costs to and from European and North American markets are high, and external 
trade is perceived as risky (especially with South Africa); the desire to pursue such 
a strategy is understandable.
Levels of official intraregional trade have historically been low. The proportion 
of recorded intra-SADCC trade in overall official trade is only 4-5% (Chr. 
Michelsen, 1986). Constraints on expanded intraregional agricultural trade include: 
food and agricultural pricing policies; shortages and official rationing of foreign 
exchange; overvalued exchange rates; state monopolies on trading; bureaucratic red- 
tape; and entrenched trading patterns with former colonial powers.
Intra-SADCC agricultural trade should be considered in the context of 
macroeconomic and agricultural policies in SADCC nations. Some agricultural 
marketing and pricing policies are in direct conflict with expanding intraregional 
trade (price controls, state trading monopolies in staple food commodities, import 
licensing) because they reduce the incentives to trade by placing restrictions on who 
can trade, what can be traded at what prices, and when trade is allowed.
This paper focuses on the incentive effects of agricultural pricing and exchange 
rate policies on intra-SADCC trade in staple food commodities. In the following 
section, recent intra-SADCC trade patterns in staple food commodities are briefly 
reviewed. Then, the transportation cost argument for intraregional trade is assessed 
by examining differences between import and export parity prices for a number of 
SADCC markets. Import parity prices from various official and parallel market 
sources are then compared to illustrate the potential incentive effects of agricultural 
pricing and exchange rate policies on intraregional trade. The paper concludes by 
advocating the need for more systematic collection of parallel market data as an 
important input into agricultural policy analysis in SADCC countries.
'Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI.
2 Thanks go to Joseph Rusike, James Shaffer, Michael Weber, and Carl Eicher for their valuable 
insights. However, the author accepts full responsibility for the views presented.
• •
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POTENTIAL AGRICULTURAL PRICING 
INCENTIVE EFFECTS ON INTRA-SADCC 
TRADE IN STAPLE FOOD COMMODITIES
Historical intra-SADCC agricultural trade patterns
In a previous paper, a database was constructed on official SADCC trade of three 
staple food commodities (maize, wheat, and rice) by destination and source for the 
years 1970 to 1985 (Kingsbury, Stackhouse, and Rusike, 1988). Maize is the most 
important of the three commodities in terms of official intraregional trade volumes 
(Table 1). However, only Zimbabwe and Malawi exported maize to other SADCC 
countries in the first half of the 1980s. In recent years, Mozambique and Tanzania 
have been the principal regional importers of SADCC maize. Most of these 
transactions have been funded by donor organizations as food aid.
Only Malawi has consistently exported rice, but quantities have been small—less 
than 10,000 mt in most years with Zimbabwe and Zambia the primary customers.
While Zimbabwe has occasionally exported small quantities of wheat, no other 
SADCC country has ever exported wheat. Moreover, the goal of wheat self- 
sufficiency remains elusive for Zimbabwe.
Modest volumes of sorghum, millet, pulses, and fish have also been traded 
intraregionally. For example, Zimbabwe has exported sorghum and millet to 
Botswana, Mozambique, and a few other countries. Here again, however, annual 
volumes have been small.
Table 1. Intra-SADCC exports of maize and rice, 1970-85 (mt).
Maize Rice
Year Angola Malawi Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe TOTAL Angola Malawi Tanzania TOTAL
1970 17,905 0 20,000 1 87300 125,106 82 474 202 758
1971 10,176 4,652 26344 100 92^ 492 133,764 145 1,174 1,083 2,402
1972 0 12,733 0 0 63327 76,060 0 1,091 360 1,451
1973 0 1,172 0 0 86 1358 0 10,741 266 11,007
1974 0 19,6(50 0 69,133 258 89,051 0 8,053 38 8391
197S 0 15,962 0 0 20349 36311 0 5341 0 5341
1976 0 0 0 8309 18366 27375 0 2326 0 2326
1977 0 0 0 22,139 0 22,139 0 3331 0 3331
1978 0 0 37,120 21303 0 59,023 0 3385 60 3345
1979 0 13350 0 14300 5,600 33350 0 6387 0 6387
1980 0 0 17 13 0 30 0 12313 0 12313
1981 0 0 0 0 107,184 107,184 0 200 0 200
1982 0 49 0 0 303385 303334 4390 2371 0 7361
1983 0 76342 0 0 220/117 296,759 0 197 0 197
1984 0 152370 0 0 0 152370 0 0 0 0
198S 0 57,722 0 0 154317 212,039 0 5 0 5
Source: Kiugabury, Stadchouee, and Rurike (1988).
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Transportation costs and intraregional trade
Previous researchers have posited that high overland transportation costs are an im­
portant source of competitive advantage for intraregional trade (Koester, 1986)3. 
To assess the potential transportation cost advantages of intra-SADCC trade, import 
and export parity prices are calculated and compared.
The import/export parity price represents the opportunity cost of a given country’s 
tradable commodities (Scandizzo and Bruce, 1980). The import parity price is the 
c.i.f. import price at a country’s border, converted using an appropriate exchange 
rate, and adjusted for transport and handling to a relevant domestic market. If a 
commodity can be locally produced less expensively than it can be imported, then 
import substitution may be profitable. The export parity price is the f.o.b. export 
price, adjusted from a given export market to the appropriate domestic market (or 
project boundary). If the export parity price is higher than the cost of locally 
producing a good and transporting it to the relevant domestic market, then that good 
may be competitive in the export market under consideration.
In the context of assessing intra-SADCC trade potential, examination of import 
and export parity prices is useful for several reasons. First, the lower the export 
parity price, the more difficult it will be for a country to profitably export, as high 
transportation costs outweigh any production cost advantage that the country might 
enjoy. Second, if import sources are distant, import parity prices will be high 
because transportation costs make up a large part of the c.i.f. price. This provides 
greater latitude for import-substituting domestic production. Third the larger the 
spread between import and export parity prices, the greater the potential to produce 
locally and export to nearby markets, or alternatively, to import from nearby sources. 
Large import/export parity price spreads can therefore be used to indicate potential 
for intraregional trade.
In Table 2, import and export parity prices are calculated using the South African 
white maize price for 1985-86. The South African white maize price is employed 
because South Africa has historically been the world’s leading exporter, accounting 
for roughly two-thirds of recorded world exports during the 1975-1983 period (Table 
3). Moreover, South Africa has historically dominated the SADCC maize market 
(Figure 1) with an average market share of 43% over the 1970-1985 period.
For markets relatively close to South Africa (the BLS countries, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe), the transportation cost advantage of intra-SADCC trade does not 
appear to be substantial—as indicated by the relatively low import parity price, high 
export parity price, and narrow spreads between the two prices. By contrast, the 
difference between import and export parity prices is still large for a number of 
SADCC markets. Exporters such as Zimbabwe and Malawi could still expect to 
have a competitive edge over South Africa in northern SADCC markets. Likewise,
According to Koester, another source ot trade potential is related to the fact that regional cereals 
production variability is less than individual country production variability. This indicates that 
establishment of a regional food reserve could benefit SADCC food security. In addition, different 
patterns of production, imports, and exports among the SADCC countries may indicate potential for 
trade expansion.
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Table 2. White maize parity prices for selected SADCC markets, 1985-86 (US 
$/m t)a.
Market Import parity Export parity Difference
Gabarone, Botswana 124.50 91 JO 33.00
Maseru, Lesotho 127.00 89.00 38.00
Francistown, Botswana 130.50 85 JO 45.00
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe 137 JO 78 JO 59.00
Harare, Zimbabwe 145 JO 70 JO 75.00
Lusaka, Zambia 
Ndola, Zambia
164 JO 51J0 113.00
177 JO 38 JO 139.00
Tete, Mozambique 180 JO 35 JO 145.00
Blantyre, Malawi 193 JO 22J0 171.00
Mbeya, Tanzania 202.00 14.00 188.00
Lilongwe, Malawi 218J0 -2J0 221.00
*1985-86 South African white maize price is $108 at Johannesburg (f.a.e.). No overland handling 
charges have been included.
Sources: For transport, border and port charge data, Louis berger (1986); For the South African price, 
Maize Board (1986).
Table 3. Estimated world exports of white maize, 1975 to 1983 (’000 mt).
Country 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
South Africa 1,779 1,1,42 1,096 1J74 971 700 2,060 2,265 400
Zimbabwe 758 297 420 554 265 86 305 492 251
United States 271 213 49 88 111 323 149 170 111
Kenya 121 113 8 23 120 0 5 45 77
Tanzania 0 0 0 37 16 0 0 0 0
Zambia 17 9 26 61 0 0 0 0 0
El Salvador 0 4 1 1 2 20 10 0 0
Malawi 0 0 0 15 15 0 0 90 100
Total exports 2,946 1,778 1,600 2,353 1J00 1,129 2J29 3,062 939
South Africa as
% of total* 60.4 64.2 68J 66.9 64.7 62.0 81J 74.0 42.6
*For the period, South African exports accounted for 67.2% of total world exports. 
Source: FAO (1984).
maize surplus regions of southern Tanzania (such as Mbeya) would also enjoy a 
transportation cost advantage to parts of northern Mozambique, northern Zambia, 
and perhaps northern Malawi if these areas were in a maize deficit position.
Agricultural pricing policies and parallel markets
To this point, discussion has been limited to official trade flows at observable 
international prices. Such an approach has several limitations:
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Figure 1. Major maize exporters to SADCC (1970 to 1985).
o For some SADCC countries, unofficial cross-border trade may be very 
important--especially for regions that are distant from large urban centers. 
Zambia’s borders with Zaire, Namibia, Malawi, and Tanzania are often 
mentioned as being particularly porous.4 
oFrom a food security standpoint, official imports may rarely reach isolated 
provincial centers and villages (Lele and Candler, 1981). 
o Food commodities sold through official channels are usually purchased by 
marketing boards at fixed producer prices and then sold at fixed wholesale or 
retail prices. These prices may not accurately reflect the true costs of 
production, storage, processing, and distribution. This can result in the 
establishment of parallel markets. In some countries, the domestic parallel 
market may handle larger volumes than the official market. Therefore, analysis 
of official flows can give an incomplete picture of the actual structure of trade 
(Lele and Candler, 1981; Renkow, Leonard, and Franklin, 1983).
It is quite difficult to analyze parallel market activity in Southern Africa because 
no reliable trade volume data exist. Making matters worse, only two SADCC 
governments (Tanzania and Malawi) currently collect parallel market price data. As 
sndi, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive picture of physical flows and 
participant behavior for SADCC parallel markets. One must instead begin by
4 Zairian and donor officials estimate illegal flows of Zambian maize meal into southern Shaba 
province at 30,000 to 60,000 mt annually (Ariza-Nino and Mueller, 1988).
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identifying markets where flows may exist and then proceed to look in greater detail 
at those markets for which some data are available.
Location of parallel market activities
As stated in the previous section, the closer two regions are to each other, the 
greater the transportation cost advantage of trading if one region is a surplus 
producer while the other region is a deficit producer of a given commodity. To aid 
in the identification of geographical areas where parallel market activity in 
agricultural staples may be taking place, Table 4 and Figure 2 show adjacent cereals 
surplus and deficit zones of SADCC5. A total of 17 intracountry and 8 intercountry 
pairings are identified. Of the 17 intracountry pairings, 8 are rather dubious 
indicators of current surplus/deficit status. This is because some of the data on 
which surplus/deficit designations were based are out-of-date. For example, it
Table 4. Adjacent SADCC surplus deficit zones in cereals production.
Surplus zone Deficit zone(s)
Within individual countries
Luena Luanda, Nuambo, Monongue
Francistown Gaborone, Maun'
Lilongwe Biantyre
Lichinga Nampula, Tete
Tabora Arusha
Mbeya Arusha
Dar es Salaam Arusha
Morogoro Arusha
Chipata Kassama
Lusaka Ndola, Mongu
Across borders
Luena Luanda, Nuambo, Monongue
Francistown Bulawayo
Rumphi Kassama
Lilongwe Tete
Mbeya Kassama
Chipata Tete
Lusaka Bulawayo
Harare Tete
Source: Technosynesis (1984) for designations of surplus/deficit zones.
S The zones are roughly homogeneous agrociimatically. Zonal designations are from Technosynesis 
(1984).
I
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Figure 2. SADCC cereals production zones.
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would be hard to believe that any region in Mozambique and Angola is currently in 
surplus due to war-related disruptions in agricultural production. In addition, the 
designation of Francistown as a surplus zone is based on data prior to the six-year 
drought of the 1980s. For similar reasons, two of the eight intercountry pairings 
are questionable.
Constraints and potentials for expanding trade when parallel markets are considered 
Closer examination of one of the intercountry pairings may shed some light on the 
constraints and potential for expanding intra-SADCC trade when parallel markets 
are also taken into account. Although Mbeya (southwestern Tanzania) and Kassama 
(northeastern Zambia) are adjacent, they are dissimilar in a number of ways which 
could indicate trade potential. While Mbeya typically produces surpluses of maize, 
rice, millet, sorghum, and beans, Kassama’s less favorable soils have made it a 
historically deficit cereals producer. Leading staples in northern Zambia have 
traditionally been sorghum, millet, cassava, and rice. However, government subsidies 
in combination with low official producer prices for traditional crops have 
encouraged maize production and consumption, despite a comparative disadvantage 
in maize-relative to more traditional crops and great distances to maize 
consumption centers such as Lusaka and the Copperbelt (World Bank, 1985). 
Mbeya and Kassama are also linked by the TAZARA railway and the TANZAM 
highway so circulation between the two markets may not be as serious a problem as 
it is for many other regions of SADCC which are located far from national capitals. 
Moreover, distance from other maize exporting countries such as South Africa and 
Zimbabwe indicate a potential transportation cost advantage for trade between these 
two regions.
Table 5 presents the structure of Zambian breakfast and roller meal subsidies in 
late 1985. Treasury losses per mt were substantial as retail-level consumers paid 
only about half the costs of milled maize. Because official consumer maize meal 
prices are pan-seasonal and pan-territorial, this also adds an element of subsidy 
(which is not quantified here).
In Table 6, import parity prices at Kassama for various official and parallel market 
sources have been calculated. Among the official sources, Zimbabwe is the least 
expensive. Zimbabwean maize is less expensive than South African maize because 
the overland transportation distance is substantially shorter.
Although Tanzanian maize (from Mbeya) enjoys a transportation cost advantage 
over maize from Zimbabwe (the distance from Mbeya to Kassama is only 300 km 
while Harare to Kassama is 1,340 km), two factors render Tanzanian maize 
uncompetitive. First, parastatal handling costs are much higher in Tanzania6 7,
6 However, if civil order were restored to Mozambique and Angola, these regions could eventually 
regain their position as net cereals exporters.
7 The Tanzanian agricultural marketing parastatal for maize and a number of other staple 
commodities is the National Milling Company (NMC). Its counterpart in Zimbabwe is the Grain 
Marketing Board (GMB).
AGRICULTURAL PRICING POLICY AND TRADE IN SADCC 267
Table 5. Structure of official Zambian breakfast and roller meal consumer 
subsidies, December 1985 (kwacha/mt).
Breakfast meal Roller meal
Producer price (mt unmilled) 611.00 611.00
NAMBOARD handling 193.00 193.00
Mt of unmilled maize for 1 mt of meal 1.54 1.11
Cost prior to milling for 1 mt of meal 1,238.16 892.44
Miller and retail margin 198.28 143.20
Full cost at retail level 1,436.44 1,035.64
Official retail price (mt) 746.40 575.40
Government profit loss -690.04 -460.24
Official retail price as %  of cost 52.00 55.60
Source: Snell (1987).
constituting over 30% of the free-on-rail (f.o.r). cost at Mbeya. By contrast, GMB 
handling costs make up only 12% of the free-on-truck (f.o.t). Harare cost. More 
importantly, the Tanzanian shilling was substantially overvalued against the Zambian 
kwacha in December 1985. If parallel market exchange rates are used as a basis for 
comparison, the shilling was 167% overvalued against the kwacha whereas the 
Zimbabwe dollar was 12% undervalued against the kwacha8. If officially marketed 
Tanzanian maize were to be exported at parallel market exchange rates, the import 
parity price of unmilled maize at Kassama would fall from K2877/mt to K1184/mt, 
making it much more competitive.
Limitation of parallel market rate
The parallel market rate is not an entirely reliable indicator of the exchange rate 
that would prevail if exchange rates were market-determined. This is because 
suppliers and demanders of parallel market currencies require a risk premium, due 
to the possibility of getting caught and punished by the authorities (Roemer, 1984).
However, the goal here is not to indicate the exact magnitude of overvaluation9. 
Rather, it is to demonstrate that in a region where most currencies are overvalued
g
Calculated as follows: Official Exchange Rate Parallel Exchange Rate
(OER) (PER)
Shilling per kwacha 2.89 7.71
.Zimbabwe dollar per kwacha 0.345 0.303
Percentage over/undervaluation: (PER/O ER - 1) x 100. Overvaluation of the shilling relative to the 
kwacha = 166.8%. Undervaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar relative to the kwacha = 12.2%.
9 For the latter half of 1986, Fletcher (1987) categorized the level of overvaluation of the Tanzanian 
-^shilling as high, the Zimbabwe dollar as medium, and the Zambian kwacha as low. The Zambian 
Hbocha depreciated significantly in 1986 during the foreign exchange auction. At the point in time 
rObserved by Fletcher, it is therefore likely that the Zimbabwe dollar had become overvalued, relative
Lto the Zambian kwacha.£
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Table 6. Import parity prices for white maize at Kassama, Zambia from various 
sources.*
From various official sources, December 1985:
Johannesburg Harare Mbeya
Export price (free-on-rail) $US 108.00 ZJ 207.77 TSH 7,702.00
Dry-port chaise JUS 8.00 na na
Transport to  border JUS 25.40 ZJ 31.50 TSH 171.97
Border charge JUS 1.00 ZJ 330 TSH 1650
Total JUS 142.40 ZJ 24257 TSH 7,890.47
Official exchange rate K/JUS1 5.70 K/ZJ1 2.90 K/TSH1 0.35
Border price K 811.68 K 703.45 K 2,761.66
Internal transport K 237.12 K 192.09 K 31.30
Miller + retail margin K 128.88 K 128.88 K 128.88
Import parity price K 1,177.68 K 1,024.42 K 2,921.84
IPP for 1 mt breakfast meal K 1,813.63 K 1,577.61 K 4,499.64
IPP for 1 mt roller meal K 1,307.22 K 1,13731 K 3,24325
From parallel market sources at Mbeya, Tanzania:
October 1985 April 1986
Producer price TSH 3,860.73 TSH 7,360.38
Handling TSH 493.00 TSH 493.00
Transport to border (by road) TSH 343.94 TSH 343.94
Total TSH 4,697.67 TSH 8,197.32
Parallel exchange rate K/TSH1 0.10 K/TSH 10.13
Border price K 469.77 K 1,065.65
Internal transport (by road) K 71.13 K 71.13
Miller + retail margin K 128.88 K 128.88
Import parity price K 669.78 K 1,265.66
IPP for 1 mt breakfast meal K 1,031.46 K 1,949.12
IPP for 1 mt roller meal K 743.45 K 1,404.88
"Unmilled maize is converted to breakfast and roller meal with conversion factors of 1.54 and 1.11 
respectively. Transport of Harare maize is by road and rail, Johannesburg maize and official Mbeya 
maize by rail, while parallel market Mbeya maize is by road. Local currencies are Zambian kwacha (K);
Zimbabwe dollar (Z$); and Tanzanian shilling (TSH).
Sources: Transport, border, and port charges from Louis Berger (1986); Breakfast and roller meal
conversion factors and miller and retail margins from Snell (1987); Official exchange rates from IMF 
(various issues); Parallel exchange rates from Cowitt (1986); Tanzanian official and parallel market 
prices and handling charges from Marketing Development Bureau (1986); South African export price 
from Maize Board (1986); Zimbabwe export price from Grain Marketing Board (1987).
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to some extent, if the magnitude of overvaluation differs significantly among the 
currencies, this can seriously inhibit trade as countries with relatively more 
overvalued currencies price themselves out of regional markets. This occurs 
regardless of whether payments are made in local or convertible currencies (Koester, 
1986).
Unlike official prices, parallel market prices include a seasonal element. The 
October 1985 producer price at Mbeya is only one-half the April 1986 price. While 
the April Mbeya price is not competitive with the Zimbabwe price, the October 
Mbeya import parity price is far lower than any of the other parity prices, even 
though transport charges are calculated using more expensive road rates. The end 
result is that govemment-to-govemment trade may inhibit informal trade as the 
seasonal element is subsidized in official trade, either by the source government that 
pays interest and handling charges for storage to make its exports more competitive, 
or by the importing government through its pan-seasonal producer and consumer 
pricing policies.
Impact of consumer subsidies on trade
The high level of subsidies to consumers for staple food commodities such as maize 
meal is a substantial barrier to intra-SADCC trade. Even the extremely inexpensive 
October 1985 Mbeya maize can not compete with subsidized Zambian maize meal. 
However, the magnitude of the subsidy encourages over consumption. Zambia’s 
recent history of maize meal shortages (especially in provinces off the line-of-rail) 
makes it highly unlikely that the official retail price is the actual market price facing 
consumers in many parts of the country, except perhaps during the period just after 
harvest when supplies are most plentiful (Borton and Shoham, 1985).
On the other hand, expanded cross-border trade may occur due to subsidy 
leakages. Although Zaire is not a member state of SADCC, no discussion of 
SADCC parallel trade would be complete without discussing the extensive smuggling 
of Zambian maize meal into the southern Shaba Province of Zaire10. Maize 
consumption in Shaba Province is estimated at approximately 470,000 mt annually 
with local production meeting only about two-thirds of these requirements. The 
most important Zairian market is Lubumbashi whose 600,000 inhabitants consume 
roughly, one-half of all maize consumed in Shaba.
As mentioned earlier, Zairian estimates of smuggled Zambian maize meal into 
Shaba range from 30,000 to 60,000 mt annually. Informal importers generally 
operate on a small scale, paying lorry owners to transport their bags or alternatively 
crossing the border by rail with their merchandise. Most consignments are in the 
1-2 mt range. At informal depots on the Zairian side of the border, consignments 
are consolidated for trucking to the major Lubumbashi wholesale market. Despite 
diseconomies of scale and risks from occasional crackdowns by Zambian officials, 
informal trade with Shaba is very lucrative (Table 7). While profit margins may not
10 The following discussion of the Zambia/Zaire maize trade is largely based on Ariza-Nino and 
Mueller (1988).
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provide sufficient inducement for traders to engage in maize meal smuggling into 
Tanzania, the Zairian margins provide a very powerful incentive to traders.
While such trade can contribute to the food security of recipient country 
populations, it can hardly be viewed favourably by governments in countries who 
subsidize the food consumption of neighboring populations. From a political 
perspective, such smuggling also exacerbates shortages in the subsidizing country 
which can lead to unrest.
By all accounts, the Zambian maize meal subsidy leakage to Zaire is significant. 
Using 1985 subsidy figures from Table 5, and assuming that 30,000 mt of maize 
meal are smuggled annually into Shaba (50% breakfast meal and 50% roller meal), 
the Zambian maize meal subsidy leakage can be roughly estimated at K17,250,000 
or about US$3 million (at the December 1985 exchange rate of K5.7 = US$1). The
Table 7. Illustrative profit margins for subsidized Zambian maize meal in two 
cross-border parallel markets (per mt)1
From Ndola to Lubumbashi, Zaire (December, 1987).
Item Unit Breakfast meal Roller meal
Retail price, Ndola K 750.00 570.00
Parallel exchange rate Z/K 18.00 8.00
Zaire border price Z 6,000.00 4,560.00
Internal transport z 6,000.00 3,360.00
Import parity price z 48,000.00 46,000.00
Profit margin (%) 412.8 480.8
From Kassama to Mbeya, Tanzania (November, 1985):
Roller meal
Retail price, Ndola K 575.00
Transport to border K 71.13
Total K 646.53
Parallel exchange rate TSH/K1 7.69
Tanzania border price TSH 4,971.82
Internal transport TSH 343.94
Import parity price TSH 5,315.76
Actual parallel mkt. price TSH 10,000.00
Profit margin (%) 88.1
*A11 transport by road; Local currencies are: Zambian kwacha (K); Zairian Zaire (Z); and Tanzanian 
shilling (TSH).
Sources: Road transport charges from Louis Berger (1986); Zambian breakfast and roller meal retail 
prices from Zanbian CSO (1988); Parallel exchange rates from Cowitt (1986) and Ariza-Nino and 
Mueller (1988); Tanzanian parallel market retail maize flour price from Marketing development 
Buereau (1986). Price is for sembe which is the rough equivalent of roller meal in Tanzania.
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current leakage figure may be much higher for two reasons.* First, exports may be 
greater than 30,000 mt. Secondly, the costs of producing, processing, and distributing 
meal have risen substantially since late 1985, whereas the official nominal retail price 
in Zambia has remained more or less unchanged. For example, the official 
preplanting producer price for maize for the upcoming 1988-89 planting season is 
Kl,200/mt, or almost double the nominal 1985-86 producer price. This factor alone 
greatly widens the gap between the cost price of milled maize and the subsidized 
consumer price.
Impact of pan-territorial prices
Even if SADCC exchange rates were devalued (or happened to be overvalued at 
equivalent levels), consumer subsidies were relaxed, official prices were made to 
more fully take into account the seasonality of supply and demand, and borders were 
opened to free trade, resulting trade patterns would still not reflect comparative 
advantage if the policy of pan-territorial pricing was continued. As mentioned 
earlier, although Zambia’s Northern Province is not climatically suited to maize 
production, pan-territorial pricing and attractive producer prices for maize relative 
to traditional crops have contributed to making the Northern Province a surplus 
maize-growing region. Land and labor have been pulled out of sorghum and cassava 
to produce surpluses for consumption in the distant Copperbelt and Lusaka markets. 
Because pan-territorial pricing directly implies subsidized transportation, the already 
over-burdened trucking fleet is further strained. Moreover, trade with nearby cross- 
border markets is discouraged while trade with far-away domestic urban markets is 
encouraged.
Imnact of price structure on crop production patterns
In a number of SADCC countries, the structure of relative producer prices appears 
to have discouraged production of traditional drought-resistant crops such as 
sorghum or crops with high nutritive value such as groundnuts. In Table 8, indices 
of official producer prices of selected crops relative to maize are presented for 
several SADCC countries. The structure of relative prices in. 1975 serves as the 
base.
The pricing policies of Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania have evolved since the 
1970s so as to discourage official marketings of sorghum, relative to maize (Jansen, 
1982; Jansen, 1986). Zimbabwean and Zambian pricing policies have also 
discouraged groundnut production while Malawian policy has favored groundnuts. 
Tanzania  appears to have encouraged beans and cassava, relative to maize. 
However, official producer prices are often not competitive with parallel market 
prices in Tanzania, so only small volumes pass through official channels (Muir, 1984; 
Tanzania, 1986).
Impact of biased infrastructural investment
Beyond pricing policy, development of marketing infrastructure and agricultural 
research policy in most SADCC countries have historically been oriented towards 
maize and export crops at the expense of drought-resistant crops. While this appears
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to be changing in the realm of agricultural research, storage construction, 
cooperative organization, and rural distribution networks are still largely developed 
with maize in mind (Lipton, 1986). As a result, the bulk of drought-resistant crop 
surpluses tend to be marketed through informal channels in a number of SADCC 
countries.
LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
Four caveats are in order in examining the data presented in the previous section: 
o All the import parity prices calculated are "snapshots" and therefore subject to 
substantial modification over time as interannual and seasonal supply and 
demand conditions change and exchange rates fluctuate. This detracts 
somewhat from the robustness of these preliminary findings, 
o Data on parallel market handling costs are unavailable. Instead, the authors 
used Tanzanian parastatal figures for handling costs, shrinkage, and fumigation. 
Actual parallel market handling costs could be lower or higher than the figures 
cited. They would be lower if informal traders were more efficient or offered 
fewer services than the NMC. On the other hand, procurement, handling, and 
transportation costs could be higher in the parallel market because informal 
traders typically deal in small lots. This prevents the achievement of economies 
of scale.
Table 8. Indices of producer prices for selected crops relative to maize producer 
prices for four SADCC countries, 1970 to 1986*.
Zambia Zimbabwe Malawi Tanzania
Year G’nut Sorghum G’nut Sorghum G’nut Sorghum Beans Cassava
1970 85.71 111.90 na 100.63 100.14 na na na
1971 75.00 97.92 64.51 114.83 120.34 na na na
1972 69.77 91.09 74.79 143.35 114.92 123.08 na na
1973 86.18 91.09 62.92 102.39 108.22 161.62 na 187.88
1974 116.28 96.90 70.99 92.25 121.71 117.33 90.67 144.00
1975 100.00 100.00 100.00 10.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1976 116.71 79.37 74.14 130.10 106.55 120.00 133.33 125.00
1977 116.71 79.37 78.49 128.47 122.18 125.49 219.61 141.18
1978 123.70 73.53 82.38 126.04 182.49 125.49 219.61 152.94
1979 104.58 55.56 80.73 117.78 143.09 106.67 186.67 130.00
1980 87.98 42.74 62.68 110.03 143.57 106.67 186.67 130.00
1981 93.03 55.56 48.11 85.36 96.02 71.11 124.44 93.33
1982 88.24 46.88 51.80 85.36 142.98 9152 106.67 102.86
1983 88.40 72.86 55.50 89.07 143.77 96.97 121.21 109.09
1984 85.83 63.44 47.57 89.07 164.58 80.00 106.67 100.00
1985 95.20 79.15 41.11 89.07 11150 81.27 121.90 114.29
1986 70.24 64.77 61.67 89.07 176.63 na na na
Producer price of selected crops relative to maize producer price in 1975 serves as base.
Sources: For Zambian prices, Jansen (1986); for Zimbabwean prices, Morris (1987); for Malawian 
prices, Lele (1988); for Tanzanian prices, Marketing Development Bureau (1986).
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o No attempt has been made to determine the risk premium necessary to induce 
traders to participate in illegal cross-border trade. This premium can be quite 
high if borders are heavily policed or large bribes must be paid to officials to 
facilitate movement of goods. The risk premium may be even higher if informal 
trade in commodities also involves illegal trade in currencies to facilitate 
payment. Because currency convertibility is not an issue in parallel in-country 
trade, the premium for engaging in illegal cross-border trade may be higher 
than the premium necessary to induce traders to participate in illegal intra­
provincial trade.
o Transportation costs may be much higher than the figures indicate and 
availability at any price may be a serious constraint for private traders in a 
number of SADCC countries where trucking fleets have seriously deteriorated 
due to spare parts shortages.
Consequently, the analysis is admittedly incomplete. In subsequent research, 
longer time-series data will be obtained on open-market prices, marketing costs, and 
parallel and official exchange rates to see how conditions have evolved over time. 
Historical levels of SADCC currency overvaluation will be calculated and an attempt 
will be made to assess the relative contributions of overvalued exchange rates, 
marketing costs, and agricultural subsidies to trading incentives.
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
While evidence exists that there is a basis for intra-SADCC trade in staple food 
commodities, there are significant policy-related constraints which are impeding the 
expansion of official trade. Among the most difficult constraints to overcome are 
overvalued exchange rates which have the potential to greatly impede intraregional 
trade if SADCC currencies are greatly overvalued with respect to one another. The 
structure of current food and agricultural pricing policy is another major barrier to 
increased official trade. The widespread presence of consumer subsidies and pan- 
seasonal and pan-territorial prices prevent both the private sector and parastatal 
bodies from engaging in profit-generating trade. Under the present array of price- 
related policies, it is hard to see how continued government-to-govemment trade 
(much of which is underwritten by food aid donors) can lead to greater SADCC 
food self-reliance. Such trade is not sustainable if source country governments 
consistently lose money in the form of export subsidies and importing country 
governments lose money through consumer subsidies.
However, it must be recognized that SADCC governments often have very 
compelling reasons for maintaining overvalued exchange rates and intervening 
extensively in food and agricultural markets. Policymakers often view food self- 
sufficiency, price stability, affordable food for urban wage earners, and maintenance 
of farm sector income and employment as far more important objectives than the 
promotion of allocative efficiency through "getting prices right." If, however, the 
objective of increasing food security-related intraregional trade is important to 
SADCC governments, expansion of official trade in commodities which are 
important to food security can not occur on any meaningfully sustainable scale if
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governments do not first deal with these much larger issues of macroeconomic and 
agricultural policy reform.
Although price barriers have the potential to significantly impede increased intra- 
SADCC trade, "getting prices right" alone will not automatically lead to its expansion. 
A number of nonprice barriers which result in high transactions costs may also 
inhibit trade. Among the most serious of these barriers is shortage of foreign 
exchange and the operation of foreign exchange rationing systems in a number of 
SADCC countries. Even if the price is "right” for some agricultural commodity or 
input, government may prohibit its importation in the quantities and at the time 
desired because other goods are believed to be of higher priority.
This paper provides preliminary evidence that the incentives for engaging in 
informal intraregional trade may be far greater than for official trade. Informal 
trading networks may have the potential to serve remote provincial markets more 
effectively than official networks, thus improving the food security of those 
populations. However, at present, we know little about how parallel markets operate 
in SADCC countries. This holds for domestic as well as cross-border markets. 
Therefore, it is hard to generate any solid conclusions about the relative efficacy of 
alternative trading networks or which specific policies need encouragement.
As previously mentioned, only two SADCC governments collect open-market price 
data. However, numerous studies point out that parallel market activity is 
widespread in SADCC countries, particularly in rural areas not well served by official 
markets (Renkow et al., 1983; Child, Muir, and Blackie, 1984; Malambo, 1987). For 
agricultural policy analysis to be more reliable at the national and regional levels, 
such data needs to be collected by more SADCC governments. Collection of open- 
market price data for staple food commodities could be an appropriate activity for 
the SADCC Regional Early Warning System to promote. Collection and timely 
analysis of open-market price data can also provide useful information to Early 
Warning System personnel on the potential vulnerability of populations at risk from 
drought (Borton and Shoham, 1985).
In addition, more work needs to be done on the structure, conduct, and 
performance of parallel trading networks. The employment effects of these markets 
may be important contributors to food security. In addition, if the risk premiums 
involved in trading are found to be quite high, official encouragement of this trade, 
or at least acceptance, could lead to a reduction of these premiums, resulting in 
lower food prices to consumers.
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